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'•· 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
·V· 
GARY WILLIAM DANIELS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 15509 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
, 
This is a criminal proceeding in which the appellant, GARY 
if/ILLIAM DANIELS, was charged with the crime of Theft in the Second 
Degree in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by a jury on October 6, 1977, before the 
Honorable Jay E. Banks, and found guilty of Theft in the Second Degree. 
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate 
term as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judgment 
rendered b l 
e ow and a remand of the case to the Third Judicial District 
b 
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Court for a new trial, or in the alternative, the appellant seeks 
reversal of the judgment rendered below and a remand of the case tr 
the Third Judicial District Court with the instructions to enter a 
a judgment for the lesser included offense of depriving an owner 
and to impose the appropriate modifications in the sentence. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the evening of June 14, 1977, a 1968 Corvette was 
taken from the lot of Midvalley Auto, in Sandy, Utah (T. 5, 7). The 
owner of Midvalley Auto, Lee Bateman, had recently completed rebui>I 
the car, putting in an engine, transmission, drive line and radiate: 
and replacing some wiring (T. 6, 10). The Corvette was returned tc: 
owner approximately 30 days later (T. 7-8, 11). 
At approximately 11:30 a.m. on June 15, CaliforniaHighk 
1a 
Patrolman, Bruce Ayers, observed a 1968 Corvette traveling westbour> 
v 
at 75 m.p.h. on Interstate 80 near Floriston, California (T. 27·1!: 
a 
The officer pursued the vehicle, traveling at a speed in excess of w, 
100 m. p. h. , until the vehicle engine blew out and the car coasted . jS1 
to a stop (T. 28-29). When the officer approached the Corvette, t: bi 
' 
appellant was then arrested for reckless driving and driving withe. ir 
a license (T. 30-31). At the time of the arrest, the vehicle seri: 
numbers were not altered and the patrolman noted no indications of; 0, 
attempt to disguise the identity of the vehicle (T. 35). Th corv11 e Ca 
had a Utah license plate on the rear portion only which was sub· !an 
sequently determined not to be on file with the Utah Department oi hi 
. d h ppellanr Motor Vehicles (T. 38). Patrolman Ayers questione tea re 
- 2 -
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the car registration while the appellant was in the jail of about 
N da County Sheriff's Office (T. 31-32). At that time, the , rhe eva 
appellant said that he owned the car (T. 33) . 
officer Larry Davis of the Sandy City Police Department 
went to Truckee, California to pick up the appellant and bring him back 
to Salt Lake City (T. 13). While driving from Truckee to Reno, Nevada, 
officer Davis questioned the appellant about the Corvette and appellant 
stated to him that: 
. he and his friend were in the dealership on 
State Street in the Sandy area he went to. His buddy 
popped a door lock out on the passenger side. He 
had a set of General Motors keys and just opened 
the door on the driver's side. Someone came along. 
They walked down the street, came back. He said 
he did his number on the ignition switch and they 
left in the vehicle. (T. 26). 
Stephen Rex Daniels, appellant's brother, testified that the 
/appellant came to Salt Lake in the beginning of June, 1977, and 
visited with his grandmother and other relatives in the area and 
appellant lived in Alameda, California (T. 42). While the appellant 
was in Salt Lake in June, his car was impounded (T. 40-43). Stephen 
stated that the appellant sought to borrow money or a car from his 
brother in order to leave Salt Lake but that he was unable to help 
in either respect (T. 44). 
The appellant, Gary William Daniels, took the stand in his 
own defense. He testified that his permanent residence was in Alameda, 
California and that he drove his car to Salt Lake to visit his brother 
and other relatives (T. 46). While the appellant was in Salt Lake, 
his car was impounded and he couldn't afford the costs to get it 
re!eased (T 47, 51) The appellant stated that after· his car was 
- 3 -
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impounded, he wanted to return to his home in California but that 
his efforts to borrow money from his mother and brother were uns, 
ful (T. 47). Appellant admitted that he took the Corvette to get 
transportation to Alameda, California on the evening before his 
arrest (T. 47-48). He stated that he removed the console in 0~H 
shift gears and make the car driveable because the linkage was lo, 
and the gears would not otherwise shift (T. 48-49). After taking: 
car from _the Auto agency, appellant picked up his tool box and a,~ 
suitcase with clothes, put gas in the car and then headed to Cali:l 
(T. 49). Appellant testified that he took the vehicle to get to 
I 
Alameda, California and when he got there, he intended to park thd 
by the police station. His sole purpose in taking the vehicle was I 
for transportation from Salt Lake to Alameda, California (T. 50) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
ALLOWING THE STATE TO QUESTION THE APPELLANT 
CONCERNING OTHER BAD ACTS COMMITTED BY THE APPELLANT. 11 
During the cross-examination of the appellant, and over".·
1 
objection of defense counsel, the prosecutor elicited from the It 
appellant an admission that he had siphoned gas when he ran out o'. 
money. Because appellant's statement had no relevancy to the offo=. c 
charged, introduction of this evidence could only suggest to thej;is 
that the appellant had a propensity toward crime. The exchange o:: c 
of which the prejudicial error arose is as follows: 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
---
Q. It only cost you $15.00 to get gas to go from 
here to Truckee, California? 
A. No. 
Q. Where did you get the rest of your money for gas? 
A. My friend had a couple of dollars, and, then, 
there's other ways. 
Q. Would you like to elucidate? 
MR. HILL: I'm going to object. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
:1 Q. (By Ms. Marlowe) Tell me how you got gas between 
here and California. 
.· 
A. What you call a garden hose. 
Q. What do you mean by garden hose? 
A. Well, it's a piece of garden hose about six feet 
long. You insert into a gas tank, which is commonly 
known as siphoning. 
Q. You siphoned gas or you stole gas to get to 
California? 
A. Yes, because I used all my money before I even did 
that. (T. 51). 
Immediately following the cross-examination of the appellant, 
.defense counsel moved for a mistrial which the trial court denied on 
the basis that the inquiry was probative (T. 53-54). The appellant's 
character had not been placed at issue and the Court did not instruct 
.I the jury to disregard the statement. 
o: 
;,: The trend is well-settled in Utah that evidence of other 
crimes or c . . 1 
iv1 wrongs committed by the defendant is inadmissible unless 
ishown that it has a 
c. special relevancy to prove an element of the crime 
charged. §tate v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 771 (1969); State 
~-2:~ · 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 p. 2d 412 (1961); State v. Torgerson, 
- 5 -
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4 Utah 2d 52, 286 P.2d 800 (1955). In accord with this policy, 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person connnitted 
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occassion 
is inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit 
crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference 
that he connnitted another crime or civil wrong on 
another specified occasion but, subject to Rules 
45 and 48, such evidence is admissible when relevant 
to prove some other material fact including absence 
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent 
preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. ' 
None of the exceptions set forth in the rule which would support 
admission of other crimes evidence to prove a material fact in iss: 
is applicable to this case. The admission by the appellant that~! 
obtained gas by siphoning was not relevant to the adjudication of 
the charge of theft of a Corvette. 
The problem engendered by the use of evidence of other crJ 
is that the trier of fact, being aware that a defendant has previo) 
broken the law, may conclude that a person who once manifests anti· 
social behavior is likely to do so on another occasion. Use of su: 
evidence may result in a conviction based on a thin thread of wron< 
doing. The purpose of Rule 55 is to avoid the degradation of the , 
defendant and the implication that the defendant has a propensity: 
crime. State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963). 
. .,. 
In State v. Lopez, supra, the Court set out a balancing· . 
to assess the propriety of admitting of evidence of other crimes: 
Such harm as there may be in receiving eviden7e 
concerning another crime is to be weighed against . 
the necessity of full inquiry into the facts relating 
to the issues. 
The test balancing the probative value of evidence against the 
R• 
to the defendant was recently applied by the Court in ~
- 6 - A 
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J77 P.Zd 135 (Utah, 1977) (Utah Supreme Court No. 15328, March 
78 .J and State v. Green, 17' 19 ' 
P.2d (Utah, 1977). (Utah 
Sup rem e court No. 14435, April 12, 1978). 
Applying the balancing test to the case at bar, the prejudicial 
effect of the statement must surely tip the scales in favor of the 
appellant because the fact of siphoning gas was not probative on the 
issue of the a pp el lan t' s guilt or innocence of the offense charged. 
It is clear from the record that the trial judge erroneously 
assumed that the prosecutor's inquiry had probative value. The judge 
believed the vehicle owner had testified that a stereo or amplification 
component had been removed from the car (T. 53). The fallacy of this 
assumption was brought to the attention of the judge by the car owner, 
yet the judge did not correct his ruling or strike the appellant's 
:J 
statement and instruct the jury to disregard it (T. 54). 
) 
The case law provides examples of when statements are so 
prejudicial in and of themselves to require the reversal of a case 
on appeal. Evidence that the defendant had been charged with a crime 
in the past, even though never tried on the charge is prejudicial error, 
State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P. 2d 412 (1961). Testimony about 
a prior arrest for a similar crime than was charged required reversal, 
1§!.ate v. Kazda, supra. In the instant case, the statement was an 
inadvertant d · a mission of cormnitting a crime and therefore even more 
prejudicial th h an t e remarks in Dickson, supra, and Kazda, supra. 
Another factor which substantially contributed to the preju-
dicial ff 
e ect is that the judge did not strike the appellant's statement 
I 
or ins r h . 
. -ruct r e Jury t d" o isregard it. Without an instruction of that 
- 7 -
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nature, the evidence is left in for the jury's consideration. Sta· 
-..: 
v. St. Clair, 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P. 2d 323 (1955). Thus, the jury. 
left to consider the appellant's admission of another unrelated c·· 
., 
act in determining his guilt or innocence of auto theft. The only 
weight they could possibly give to this evidence was that the appe:, 
was a bad person. 
Examining the circumstances wherein the statement was elii 
the only reasonable conclusion is that the appellant was unjustly:i 
udiced. The judge permitted the prosecutor to ask the question ba': 
on misapprehension of the evidence; the appellant, compelled to q 
admitted an unrelated criminal act; and the judge failed to take 
curative measures to diminish the prejudice. Because the appellan! 
statement had no probative value to the case at bar, the appellant 
was denied a fair trial when the jury was permitted to consider tni' 
statement that suggested he had a propensity to commit crime. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTION OF THEFT. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended) provides: 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises I 
unauthorized control over the property of another iR 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Implicit in the State's burden of proof is the requirement to provi 01 
,if 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had the intent tO talc,, I 
I 
the owner's property and deprive him of it. State v. Kazda, s45 fdi 
2d 190 (Utah, 1976); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah, 1976).Pi 
Romero, supra, a prosecution for burglary and theft, the Court;'. 
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1 abl e mental state required for [theft] is defined as a !: "The cu P 
obJ·ective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the 
1 
• • conscious 
=~result," citing Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 (1975 Pocket Supplement). 
1 The Court elaborated on the mental state required for an auto theft 
e:,conviction in State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 (Utah, 1977), which 
involved a situation substantially similar to the instant case. In 
litComish, an automobile belonging to an auto dealership was removed 
:ifrom the lot. Approximately 24 hours later, the police apprehended 
1,, the defendant as a traffic violator and the vehicle was identified 
c:tas the one stolen from the dealership. During the trial to the court, 
the judge expressed the view that under the evidence, he was uncertain 
! of the intent of the defendant. The Utah Supreme Court found that the 
defendant was properly convicted of the lesser crime of depriving an 
1 owner (joyriding) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953 as 
amended). In holding that joyriding is a lesser included offense to 
the crime of theft, Justice Maughan writing for the Court, stated: 
Both the theft and joyriding statutes require, as 
elements of the crime, an unauthroized control over 
the property of another with an intent to deprive him 
of his property. The only fact the state is not 
required to establish for joyriding, which is re-
quired for theft, is the intent to deprive perma-
nently, or for such an extended period of time 
that a substantial portion of the economic value I is lost. 
!Reading the Court's opinion in State v. Cornish, supra, with the 
opinion in State v. Romero, supra, it is evidence that a conviction 
for auto theft requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant h d 
a a conscious objective to deprive the owner of the motor 
Veh' l 
<c.e Permanently or for such an extended period of time that a 
- 9 -
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substantial portion of the economic value is lost. 
Appellant submits that the State's evidence in the cas, 
bar cannot support the theft conviction because it fails to prove 
requisite mental state. The test to apply in weighing the suffii 
of the evidence is set out in State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 1272 rut~ 
1975). 
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence . . . it must 
appear that viewing the evidence and all infer-
ences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, 
in the light most favorable to the verdict of the 
jury, reasonable minds could not believe him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 530 P. 2d at 1272) 
In the case at bar, reasonable minds could not find or infer beyo1 
a reasonable doubt that the appellant had the intent to permanent 
deprive the owner of his Corvette because no evidence was offered 
which suggested the appellant's intent. 
The evidence showed that the appellant had unauthorized 
possession of the car for a period of approxmiately 19 hours, that 
unregistered Utah license plate was mounted on the rear of the car 
that the engine malfunctioned when the appellant was driving thee 
and that the appellant used the car as transportation to Californi 
The sole shread of evidence even suggesting intent was Patrolman 
Ayers testimony that the appellant claimed to own the car when 
initially interrogated after his arrest (T. 33). However, the apfi 
negated this claim when subsequently questioned by the Sandy CitY 
Police (T. 26). 
Appellant submits that his motion to dismiss the charge 
theft should have been granted (T. 39-40). The judge, when deny'.'. 
the appellant's motion, indicated the necessity for affirmative I· 
- 10 -
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to show depriving an owner is clearly erroneous in light of State v. 
e;~, supra, and State v. Lloyd, 568 P.2d 357 (Utah, 1977) which 
t· held the crime of depriving an owner to be a lesser included offense 
cit of auto theft. Further, such a requirement, if correct, violates 
h, the appellant's due process rights that the State prove every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 44 L.Ed. 2d 508, 95 S.Ct. 1881 (1975). 
In the case at bar, the State failed to present substantial 
direct or circumstantial evidence to show the appellant's conscious 
objective to permanently deprive. Thus, the evidence is sufficient only 
in: to show the lesser included offense of joyriding as proscribed by 
. I 
1: Utah Code Ann. §41-1-109 (1953 as amended). Because the State failed 
to present evidence upon which the jury could base the appellant's 
intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property, the Court 
must reverse the judgment of theft. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it permitted 
i< the prosecution to delve into other bad acts by the appellant, failing 
to instruct the jury to disregard the appellant's statements. Further, 
the State failed to present a prima facie case of theft by proof of all 
'ilof the elements and the conviction must be reversed for insufficent 
e · d 
vi ence to support the verdict. For the foregoing reasons, the 
appellant is entitled to a new trial. In the alternative, the Court 
: may remand the case to the District Court with the instruction to 
- 11 -
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vacate the judgment of theft and enter a judgement for the lesser 
included offense of depriving an owner and impose a new sentence 
thereon. 
Respectfully submitted, 
F. JOHN HILL 
Attorney for Appellant 
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